Abstract. Model checking is an automatic verification technique for concurrent systems that are finite state or have finite state abstractions. It has been used successfully to verify computer hardware, and it is beginning to be used to verify computer software as well. As the number of state variables in the system increases, the size of the system state space grows exponentially. This is called the "state explosion problem". Much of the research in model checking over the past 30 years has involved developing techniques for dealing with this problem. In these lecture notes, we will explain how the basic model checking algorithms work and describe some recent approaches to the state explosion problem, with an emphasis on Bounded Model Checking.
Introduction
Ensuring the correctness of software and hardware is an issue of great importance, as failures often cause considerable financial losses and can even have fatal consequences in safety-critical systems. This has led to an increased interest in applying formal methods and verification techniques in order to develop highassurance systems. Among the most successful techniques that are widely used in both research and industry is model checking.
Model checking is a collection of automatic techniques for verifying finitestate concurrent systems. This framework was developed independently in the early 1980's by Clarke and Emerson [7] and by Queille and Sifakis [21] . Traditionally, model checking has been mainly applied to hardware. However, thanks to the tremendous progress that the research community has made over the past three decades, model checking has been successfully applied to many aspects of software verification. The main obstacle that model checking faces is the state explosion problem. The number of global states of a concurrent system with multiple processes can be enormous; it is exponential in both the number of processes and the number of components per process. In these lecture notes, we will explain how the basic model checking algorithms work and describe some recent approaches to the state explosion problem, focusing in particular on bounded model checking.
Organization of these Lecture Notes
The lecture notes are organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe how reactive systems can be modeled as finite-state transition systems. Section 3 provides an overview of temporal logic, the formal notation in which we specify the desired behavior of a system. We concentrate on three main temporal logics: Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), Computation Tree Logic (CTL), and CTL * . In Section 4 we define the model checking problem and provide an overview of a basic model-checking algorithm for CTL. We also summarize the main advantages and disadvantages of model checking. In Section 5 we introduce the main disadvantage of model checking -the state explosion problem. We will explain what this problem is, what its implications are, and what key breakthroughs have been made over the past three decades. Finally, in Section 6 we focus on one such breakthrough: Bounded Model Checking (BMC). In particular, BMC has overcome a number of issues from which model checking suffers, and it has enabled the application of model checking techniques to a wide range of software and hardware systems. Section 6 describes BMC and its application in greater detail.
Modeling Concurrent Systems
In order to reason about the correctness of a system, one needs to specify the properties that the system should satisfy, i.e., the intended behavior of the system. Once we have such a specification we need to construct a formal model for the system. Such a model should capture the basic properties that must be considered in order to verify the behavioral specification (the so called atomic propositions). Furthermore, to make the verification simpler, the model should abstract away all the details that have no effect on the correctness with respect to the specification.
In these notes we shall focus on concurrent (reactive) systems and their temporal behavior. A reactive system may frequently need to interact with its environment (including the user), and often do not terminate. A simple, functional model is thus not adequate to model the behavior of a reactive system. Instead, we use Kripke structures, a type of state-transition graphs.
A Kripke structure consists of a finite set of states, a set of state transitions (i.e., a relation over the states), and a labeling function which assigns to each state the set of atomic propositions that are true in this state. In such a model, at any point in time the system is in one of the possible states, and the transition relation describes how the system moves from a state to another over one time step. The formal definition is the following. Definition 1. A Kripke structure (or state transition system) M is a quadruple M = S, S 0 , R, L consisting of 1. a finite set of states S; 2. a set of initial states S 0 ⊆ S; 3. a total transition relation R ⊆ S × S; that is, for every state s ∈ S there exists a state s ∈ S such that (s, s ) ∈ R; 4. a set AP of atomic propositions (Boolean functions over S) and a labeling function L : S → 2 AP that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions that hold in that state.
A path π in M from a state s 0 is an infinite sequence of states π = s 0 s 1 s 2 . . . where for all i ≥ 0, (s i , s i+1 ) ∈ R.
Temporal Logic
Given a state transition system (Kripke structure) M , we would like to reason about certain properties that the system should satisfy. For example, we might want to ask the following questions:
-If we start from any initial state of M , is it possible to reach an error state 1 ? -Is every request eventually acknowledged? -Can the system be always restarted 2 ?
In this section we describe several formalisms for specifying temporal properties of reactive systems. In particular, we focus on temporal logics, which can be used to concisely describe properties of paths generated by Kripke structures. For example, a temporal logic formula might specify that some particular state is eventually reached in a path, or that an error state is never reached in any path. Such properties are specified using temporal operators. Here we will focus on the following temporal logics:
-Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), in which temporal operators are provided for describing events along a single computation path (linear time). -Computation Tree Logic (CTL), in which the temporal operators quantify over the paths that are possible from a given state (branching time). -CTL * , an extension of CTL that combines both branching-time and lineartime operators.
We first describe CTL * , as it is the most expressive of the three temporal logics mentioned above.
CTL *

CTL
* [8] subsumes both LTL and CTL. Formulas in CTL * describe properties of computation trees. The tree represents all the possible paths of a Kripke structure, and it is formed by infinitely unwinding the state transition graph from the initial state as illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
* formulas consist of atomic propositions, Boolean connectives, path quantifiers, and temporal operators. There are two path quantifiers, A and E, that describe the branching structure of the computation tree:
-Af ("for all computational paths") is true iff the formula f holds along all the paths in the computation tree; -Ef ("for some computation path") is true iff the formula f is true along some path in the computation tree.
The path quantifiers A and E are dual, in fact:
There are five basic temporal operators:
-X f ("next time") is true iff the formula f holds in the second state of the path. -F f ("eventually", "in the future" or "sometimes") is true iff the formula f will hold at some state on the path. -G f ("always" or "globally") is true iff the formula f holds at every state on the path. -f U g ("until") is true iff there is a state on the path where g holds and at every preceding state on the path, f holds.
There are two types of CTL * formulas: state formulas, whose truth is defined over states, and path formulas, whose truth is defined over paths. We recall that CTL * formulas are interpreted over a given Kripke structure (Definition 1). The syntax of state formulas is defined as follows:
-an atomic proposition p ∈ AP is a state formula, -if f and g are state formulas, then ¬f , f ∨ g, and f ∧ g are state formulas, -if f is a path formula, then Af and Ef are state formulas.
The syntax of path formulas is defined as follows:
-if f is a state formula, then f is also a path formula, -if f and g are path formulas, then ¬f , f ∨ g, f ∧ g, X f , F f , G f , and f U g are path formulas.
We have the following formal definition. It is customary to assume that AP contains true, the atomic proposition which identically holds.
Definition 2 (CTL*). The syntax of CTL * is given by the grammar:
where p ∈ AP .
We now define the semantics of CTL * . Let π i denote the suffix of path π starting from the i-th state. Given a state transition M and a state formula φ, the notation M, s 0 |= φ is interpreted as "in M at state s 0 , the formula φ is true". Similarly, given a path formula ψ, the notation M, π |= ψ is interpreted as "in M , the formula ψ is true along the path π". Let φ 1 and φ 2 be state formulas and let ψ 1 and ψ 2 be path formulas. The semantics of CTL * is as follows:
and for all 0 ≤ j < k, M, π
Note that we can define the temporal operators F and G using only U in the following way (syntactic sugar):
Also, one can show that any CTL * formula can be written by using the operators ¬, ∨, X , U, and E.
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
Pnueli was the first to use temporal logic for reasoning about concurrent programs [20] . In particular, Pnueli used linear temporal logic (LTL), a sublogic of CTL * . Formulas in LTL are of the form Af , where f is a LTL path formula as follows:
-if p ∈ AP , then p is a path formula; -if f and g are path formulas, then ¬f , f ∨ g, f ∧ g, X f , F f , G f , and f U g are path formulas.
Therefore, LTL restricts state formulas to be just atomic propositions.
Definition 3 (LTL)
. Linear temporal logic formulas are of the form Aψ, with ψ given by the grammar:
The semantics of LTL formulas is the same as for CTL * path formulas.
Example 1 (LTL formulas). Note that since LTL formulas are always quantified by an outer A, the LTL formula F G p is the same as A(F G p) in CTL * . We can write G (req ⇒ F ack) for a property specifying that every request in execution is eventually acknowledged. The formula (G F enabled) ⇒ (G F executed) specifies that if an event is infinitely often enabled then it will be infinitely often executed. (The 'implication' operator ⇒ is defined by ψ 1 ⇒ ψ 2 ≡ ¬ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 .)
Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
Another useful sublogic of CTL * is CTL [7, 21] . In CTL, each basic temporal operator must be immediately preceded by a path quantifier (i.e., either A or E). In particular, CTL can be obtained from CTL * by restricting the form of path formulas as follows:
-if f and g are state formulas, then X f , F f , G f , and f U g, are path formulas.
Definition 4 (CTL).
Computation tree logic formulas are inductively defined as follows:
Example 2 (CTL formulas). We can write EF (W hiteW ins) for a property specifying that there is a way for a white player to win, and AG (EF Restart) can be written for a property specifying that it is always possible to restart from any state.
It can be shown that any CTL formula can be written in terms of ¬, ∨, EX , EG , and EU. The semantics of four widely used CTL operators is exemplified in Fig. 2 . Note that in CTL the equivalence Af ≡ ¬E¬f does not hold in general. The equivalence does hold for X , G , and F . However, for U we have that:
Expressiveness of Temporal Logics
Even though it might seem that CTL is more expressive than LTL, it is not the case. For example, the LTL formula A(F G p) cannot be expressed in CTL. Similarly, the CTL formula AG (EF p) cannot be expressed in LTL. From these examples it follows that CTL and LTL are incomparable. However, they are both sublogics of CTL * , and in fact CTL * is strictly more expressive than both LTL and CTL. For example, the CTL * formula A(F G p) ∨ AG (EF q) cannot be expressed in either CTL or LTL. The expressiveness of these three logics is illustrated in Fig. 3 . 
Model Checking
Since its development in the early 1980's, model checking has been applied to a large number of problems, such as complex sequential circuit designs and communication protocols. Model checking overcomes a number of problems that other approaches based on simulation, testing, and deductive reasoning suffer from. To mention a few, approaches based on testing are not complete, and deductive reasoning using theorem provers is generally not fully automated since it has much higher complexity. On the other hand, model checkers are 'pushbutton' software tools, they do not require any proofs, and they can provide diagnostic counterexamples when a universally path-quantified specification (i.e., a specification of the form Aφ where φ is a CTL * formula) is found to be false. Thanks to these and other features, model checkers have become very popular for (hardware) verification, and are also often used for debugging purposes.
A model checker (see Fig. 4 ) is usually composed of three main parts:
1. a property specification language based on a temporal logic; 2. a model specification language -a formal notation for encoding the system to be verified as a finite-state transition system, i.e., the model; 3. a verification procedure -an intelligent exhaustive search of the model state space that determines whether the specification is satisfied or not. In the latter case, the procedure provides a counterexample path exhibiting the violation of the specification.
We can define the model checking problem as follows.
Definition 5. Let M be a state-transition graph and let f be a temporal logic formula. The model checking problem is to find all the states s ∈ S such that M, s |= f .
In [7] , Clarke and Emerson introduced CTL and presented a corresponding verification procedure. In an independent work, Queille and Sifakis [21] introduced similar ideas. We now briefly explain a CTL verification procedure more efficient than the original one presented in [7] .
Recall that we are given a Kripke structure M = S, S 0 , R, L and a CTL formula f . Our task is to compute the set {s ∈ S | M, s |= f }. When the computation of such sets is finished, we will have that M, s |= f iff f ∈ labels(s). To compute each set label(s) we proceed as follows. Initially, every state is labeled with the atomic propositions that hold in the state, i.e., label(s) = L(s), for all s ∈ S. We then proceed recursively to label each state with the subformulas of f that hold in that state, starting from the most deeply nested subformulas, and moving outward to finish with f itself. Since any CTL formula is expressible in terms of ¬, ∨, EX , EU, and EG , the verification procedure need only to consider these types of CTL formulas.
The Boolean operators ¬ and ∨ are easily handled. For a formula of the type ¬f , we label (by "¬f ") the states that are not labeled by f . For a disjunction f ∨ g, we label (by "f ∨ g") the states that are labeled by f or by g. To handle formulas of the form EX f , we label the states from which there exists a transition to a state labeled by f .
For E[f U g], we first need to find all the states labeled by g. Then, from those states we follow the transition relation backwards (i.e., using R −1 ) to find all the states that can be reached by a path in which every state is labeled by f . The states selected in this way are labeled by "E[f U g]". In Fig.4 we give pseudocode for a procedure CheckEU that implements the labeling for formulas of the type E[f U g]. Of course, it assumes that the subformulas f and g have been already processed, i.e., all the states satisfying either f or g have been labeled accordingly.
The procedure for EG f is based on the decomposition of the state-transition graph into strongly connected components, and it is slightly more complex. The interested reader can find details in [11, Chapter 4] .
It can be shown that the time complexity of the algorithm is O(|f |·(|S|+|R|)), where |f | is the number of different subformulas of f . Because the algorithm explicitly accesses all the states of the transition system, this approach is also known as explicit-state model checking. 
Pros and Cons
Model checking is a very powerful framework for verifying specifications of finitestate systems. One of the main advantages of model checking is that it is fully automated. No expert is required in order to check whether a given finite-state model conforms to a given set of system specifications. Model checking also works with partial specifications, which are often troublesome for techniques based on theorem proving. When a property specification does not hold, a model checker can provide a counterexample (an initial state and a set of transitions) that reflects an actual execution leading to an error state. This is the reason why tools based on model checking are very popular for debugging.
One aspect that can be viewed as negative is that model checkers do not provide correctness proofs. Another negative aspect is that model-checking techniques can be directly applied only to finite-state systems. An infinite-state system can by abstracted into a finite model; however, this leads to a loss of precision. Perhaps the most important issue in model checking is the state-explosion problem. It is apparent from the complexity of the CTL model checking algorithm that its practical usefulness critically depends on the size of the state space. Basically, if number of states grows too large, so does the complexity of the verification procedure, possibly making the technique unusable. In the next Section we focus on the state explosion problem and on several possible methods to combat it.
State Explosion Problem
The number of states of a model can be enormous. For example, consider a system composed by n processes, each having m states. Then, the asynchronous composition of these processes may have m n states. Similarly, in a n-bit counter, the number of states of the counter is exponential in the number of bits, i.e., 2 n . In model checking we refer to this problem as the state explosion problem. All model checkers suffer from it. Using arguments from complexity theory, it can be shown that, in the worst case, this problem is inevitable. However, researchers have developed many techniques that address the state explosion problem. These techniques are frequently used in industrial applications of model checking. In this section, we will concentrate on key advances that make model checking a practical technique in both research and industry.
There have been several major advances in addressing the state explosion problem. One of the first major advances was symbolic model checking with binary decision diagrams (BDDs). In this approach, a set of states is represented by a BDD instead of by listing each state individually. The BDD representation is often exponentially smaller in practice. Model checking with BDDs is performed using a fixed point algorithm. Another major advance is the partial order reduction, which exploits independence of actions in a system with asynchronous composition of processes. A third major advance is counterexample-guided abstraction refinement, which adaptively tries to find an appropriate level refinement, precise enough to verify the property of interest yet not burdened with irrelevant detail that slows down verification. Finally, bounded model checking exploits fast Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers to search for counterexamples of bounded length. In this Section we give a brief overview of the first three techniques, while bounded model checking is explained in greater detail in the next Section.
Fixed-Point Algorithms
The symbolic model-checking algorithm is based on fixpoint characterizations of the basic temporal operators. For simplicity, we will consider only CTL model checking, although similar ideas can used for LTL model checking (see, e.g., Section 6.7 of [11] ). Let M = S, S 0 , R, L be a finite state-transition system. The set P(S) of all subsets of S forms a lattice under the set inclusion ordering. For convenience, we identify a state formula with the set of states in which it is true. For example, we identify the formula false with the empty set of states, and we identify the formula true with S (the set of all states). Each element of P(S) can be viewed both as a set of states and as a state formula (a predicate). A function τ : P(S) → P(S) will be called a predicate transformer.
Definition 6. We say that a state formula f is the least fixed point (or respectively greatest fixed point) of a predicate transformer τ iff (1) f = τ [f ], and (2) for all state formulas g,
A monotonic predicate transformer on P(S) always has a least fixed point and a greatest fixed point (by Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem [23] ). The temporal operators AF , EF , AU, and EU can each be characterized as the least fixed point function Lfp(τ ) { Q := false; of a monotonic transformer. Similarly, the temporal operators AG and EG can each be characterized as the greatest fixed point of a monotonic transformer:
We can calculate the least fixed point of τ as follows. We define U 0 = ∅ and U i = τ (U i−1 ) for i ≥ 1. We first compute U 1 , then U 2 , then U 3 , and so on, until we find a k such that U k = U k−1 . It can be proved that the U k computed in this manner is the least fixed point of τ . To compute the greatest fixed point, we follow a similar procedure. Pseudocode for both procedures is shown in Fig. 6 . In Fig. 7 we illustrate the computation for EF p. 
Symbolic Model Checking with OBDDs
The main idea behind symbolic model checking is to represent and manipulate a finite state-transition system symbolically as a Boolean function. In particular, Ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) [3] are a canonical form for Boolean formulas. OBDDs are often substantially more compact than traditional normal forms. Moreover, they can be manipulated very efficiently. We consider Boolean formulas over n variables x 1 , . . . , (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in the following manner:
• If v is a terminal vertex then f v (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = value(v).
• If v is a nonterminal vertex with var(v) = x i then f v (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is given by In an OBDD there is a strict total ordering of the variables x 1 , . . . , x n when traversing the diagram from the root to the terminals. In Fig. 8 we illustrate the OBDD for the formula (w ∧ x) ∨ (y ∧ z), with variable ordering w < x < y < z. Given an assignment to the variables w, x, y, and z, the value of the formula can be decided by traversing the OBDD from the root to the terminals. At each node, branching is decided by the value assigned to the variable that labels the node. For example, the assignment (w = 0, x = 1, y = 0, z = 1) generates in the OBDD the traversal w 0 → y 0 → 0, so the formula does not hold for this assignment.
In practical applications, it is desirable to have a canonical representation for Boolean functions. This simplifies tasks like checking equivalence of two formulas and deciding if a given formula is satisfiable or not. Such a representation must guarantee that two Boolean functions are logically equivalent if and only if they have isomorphic representations. Two binary decision diagrams are isomorphic if there exists a bijection H between the graphs such that
• terminals are mapped to terminals, and nonterminals to nonterminals, • for every terminal vertex v, value(v) = value(H(v)), and • for every nonterminal vertex v:
• var(v) = var(H(v)), • H(low(v)) = low(H(v)), and
A canonical representation for Boolean functions can be obtained by placing two restrictions on binary decision diagrams [3] :
• The variables appear in the same order along each path from the root to a terminal. (We write x < y to denote that x is prior to y in this ordering.) • There are no isomorphic subtrees or redundant vertexes in the diagram.
There exist efficient algorithms for operating on OBDDs. We begin with the function that restricts some argument x i of the Boolean function f to a constant value b. This function is denoted by f | xi←b and satisfies the identity
If f is represented as an OBDD, the OBDD for the restriction f | xi←b is computed by a depth-first traversal of the OBDD. For any vertex v which has an edge with a vertex w such that var(w) = x i , we replace the edge by low(w) if b is 0 and by high(w) if b is 1. If doing so renders vertex v redundant (i.e., if high(w) becomes equal to low(w)), we must remove the redundancy to preserve canonicity. We must also take care not to create a new vertex that is isomorphic to an existing vertex.
All sixteen two-argument logical operations can be implemented efficiently on Boolean functions that are represented as OBDDs. In particular, the complexity of these operations is linear in the product of the size of the argument OBDDs. The key idea for efficient implementation of these operations is the Shannon expansion
Bryant [3] gives a uniform procedure called Apply for computing all 16 logical operations. Let be an arbitrary two-argument logical operation, and let f and f be two Boolean functions. To simplify the explanation of the algorithm we introduce the following notation:
• v and v are the roots of the OBDDs for f and f ; • x = var(v) and x = var(v ).
We consider several cases depending on the relationship between v and v .
• If v and v are both terminal vertexes, then f f = value(v) value(v ).
• If x = x , then we use the Shannon expansion
to break the problem into two subproblems, which are solved recursively. The root of the resulting OBDD will be a new node r with var(r) = x, while low(r) will be the OBDD for (f | x←0 f | x←0 ) and high(r) will be the OBDD for (f | x←1 f | x←1 ).
• If x < x , then f | x←0 = f | x←1 = f since f does not depend on x. We thus have that
and the OBDD for f f is computed recursively as in the second case.
• If x < x, then the required computation is similar to the previous case.
The algorithm is made polynomial by using memoization:
• a hash table is used to record all previously computed subproblems;
• before any recursive call, the table is checked to see if the subproblem has been solved. If it has, the result is obtained from the table; otherwise, the recursive call is performed.
• The result must be reduced to ensure that it is in canonical form.
In Fig.9 we illustrate the construction of the canonical OBDD form for a simple formula. It should be noted that the size of BDDs depends greatly on the chosen variable order. For example, the BDD representing an n-bit comparator is linear with a good ordering, but exponential with a bad ordering.
Symbolic Model Checking with BDDs. Ken McMillan implemented a version of the CTL model checking algorithm using BDDs in the fall of 1987. Subsequently, much larger concurrent systems could be handled than with explicit-state model checking [5, 4] . State-transition graphs can be represented with BDDs as follows. First, we must represent the states in terms of n Boolean state variables v = v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . Then, we express the transition relation R as a Boolean formula in terms of the state variables:
where v 1 , . . . v n represents the current state and v 1 , . . . , v n represents the next state. Finally, we convert f R to a BDD.
We define a procedure ToBDD that takes a CTL formula f (v) and returns a BDD that represents exactly those states of the system that satisfy the CTL formula. We define ToBDD inductively over the structure of CTL formulas. If f (v) is an atomic proposition, then ToBDD(f (v)) is the BDD representing the set of states satisfying the atomic proposition. If f (v) has the form g 1 g 2 for some Boolean operator , then ToBDD(f (v)) = Apply(ToBDD(g 1 ) ToBDD(g 2 )). Temporal operators are handled as follows: Step-by-step construction of the canonical OBDD for the formula (w∧x)∨(y∧z), using ordering w < x < y < z.
•
If f (v) has the form ∃v i . g, then ToBDD(f (v)) = ToBDD(g| vi←0 ∨ g| vi←1 ). Finally, to check whether a formula f (v) holds true in a set of initial states I(v), we check whether the formula I(v) ⇒ f (v) holds.
Partial Order Reduction
As we have already mentioned, asynchronous composition of processes in a concurrent system may cause exponential blow-up of the system state space. This is an even bigger problem in software verification than in hardware verification. The reason is that software tends to be less structured than hardware. Hence, the state explosion problem has been the main obstacle in applying model checking to software.
One of the most successful techniques for dealing with asynchronous systems is the partial order reduction. This technique is based on the observation that many events are independent of each other, and can be executed in arbitrary order without affecting the outcome of the computation. This means that it is possible to avoid exploring certain paths in the state-transition system. In Fig. 10 we show an example of two independent paths, (s → s 0 → s ) and (s → s 1 → s ), assuming that the variables x and y are not aliases. Therefore, it is enough to explore only one of the two paths. One of the big challenges for the partial order reduction is that the reduction must be on the fly and we must locally decide which transitions can be safely ignored, as it is not feasible to construct the whole transition system first and then prune it.
Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR)
If the model state space is very large, or even infinite, performing an exhaustive search of the entire space is not feasible. Therefore, when building the model we should try to abstract only the relevant information from the (concrete) statetransition system. The counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [9] technique uses counterexamples to refine an initial abstraction. Let M = S, s 0 , R, L be a Kripke structure. We write M α = S α , s α 0 , R α , L α to denote the abstraction of M with respect to an abstraction mapping α. We assume that the states of both M and M α are labeled with atomic propositions from a set AP. A function α : S → S α is an abstraction mapping from M to M α with respect to a set of atomic propositions A α ⊆ AP iff the following three conditions hold true:
If there is a transition from s to t in M , then there is a transition from α(s)
to
In Fig. 11 we illustrate a concrete system and its abstraction. The key theorem relating abstract and concrete systems was proved by Clarke, Grumberg, and Long [10] : an abstraction preserves all the true formulas of a certain fragment of CTL * .
Theorem 1 (Property Preservation Theorem).
If a universal CTL * property holds on the abstract model, then it holds also on the concrete model.
A universal CTL
* formula must not contain existential path quantifiers (E) when written in negation normal form. For example, AG f is a universal formula, while EG f is not.
It is easy to show that the converse of the Property Preservation Theorem is not true, i.e., there are universal properties which holds in the concrete system but fail in the abstract system. Therefore, a counterexample to the property in the abstract system may not be a counterexample in the concrete system. Such counterexamples are called spurious. Given a counterexample in the abstract system, we can decide whether it is spurious or not simply by executing it on the concrete system. If the counterexample checks on the concrete system, i.e., it is not spurious, then we have found an actual violation of the property and thus a bug in the system. If the counterexample is spurious, then we use it to refine the abstraction mapping, and we check again the property on the more precise abstraction. We continue this process until there are no spurious counterexamples.
In general, the presence of spurious counterexamples cannot be avoided, since the abstract model over-approximates the state space of the concrete system. This is due to the loss of information caused by the abstraction mapping. However, the state space of the abstract system is usually much smaller than that of the concrete system, making the abstract system amenable to model checking. 
Bounded Model Checking
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [1] is the method used by most industrialstrength model checkers today. Given a finite state-transition system, a temporal logic property, and a bound k, BMC generates a propositional formula that is satisfiable if and only if the property can be disproved by a counterexample of length k. This propositional formula is then fed to a Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver. If no counterexample of length k is found, then we look for longer counterexamples by incrementing the bound k. For safety properties (i.e., checking whether a "bad" state is unreachable), it can be shown that we only need to check counterexamples whose length is smaller than the diameter of the system -the smallest number of transitions to reach all reachable states. Alternatively, BMC can be used for bug catching (rather than full verification) by simply running it up to a given counterexample length or for a given amount of time. BMC has several advantages over symbolic model checking with BDDs:
1. BMC finds counterexamples faster than BDD-based approaches. 2. BMC finds counterexamples of minimal length. 3. BMC uses much less memory than BDD-based approaches. 4. BMC does not require the user to select a variable ordering and does not need to perform costly dynamic reordering.
In BMC, the states of the model are represented as vectors of Booleans. For example, in a hardware circuit, the state of each flip-flop would be usually encoded as a single Boolean variable. A state transition system is encoded as follows:
• the set of initial states is specified by a propositional formula I(s) that holds true iff s is an initial state; • the transition relation is specified by a propositional formula R(s, s ) that holds true iff there exists a transition from s to s ; • for each atomic proposition p, there is a propositional formula p(s) that holds true iff p is true in state s. k−1 i=0 R(s i , s i+1 ) holds true (for all i < k there exists a transition s i → s i+1 ) For simplicity, we first describe BMC for LTL safety properties of the form G p, where p is an atomic proposition.
Safety Properties
The property G p asserts that p holds true in all reachable states (remember that LTL formulas are implicitly quantified by an outer A path operator.) We wish to determine whether there exists a counterexample whose length is no larger than a fixed bound k. In other words, we wish to determine whether there exists a valid path prefix (s 0 , ..., s k ) in which p fails for some state s i , with i ≤ k. Thus, we have that a sequence (s 0 , ..., s k ) is a counterexample to G p iff the following formula is satisfiable: 
We want to model check the property G p. First we try to find a counterexample of length k = 0. (We measure length of a path prefix by the number of transitions between states, not the number of states; a counterexample of length 0 is a sequence of exactly one state.) Substituting into formula (1), we obtain:
which is clearly unsatisfiable, so no counterexample of length 0 exists. It turns out that the shortest counterexample is of length 3. In fact, for k = 3 we have that formula (1) becomes
which is satisfiable by the states (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) = ( 000 , 001 , 011 , 111 ). Therefore, the sequence of state transitions s 0 → s 1 → s 2 → s 3 is a counterexample to G p.
In practice, the formulas obtained by expanding (1) can be very large. Nevertheless, BMC remains useful because modern SAT solvers can efficiently handle formulas with millions of clauses.
Determining the Bound
We now discuss two methods for determining the counterexample length when verifying a safety property such as G p. Let d be the diameter of the system, i.e., the least number of steps to reach all reachable states. Alternatively, d is the least number for which the following holds: for every state s, if there exists a valid path prefix that contains s (i.e., s is reachable), then there exists a valid path prefix of length at most d that contains s. Clearly, if property p holds for all valid path prefixes of length k, where k ≥ d, then p holds for all reachable states. So, we only need to consider counterexamples of length at most d. However, finding d is computationally hard.
Given a bound k, we can decide whether k ≥ d by solving a quantified Boolean formula. In particular, if every state reachable in k + 1 steps can also be reached in up to k steps, then k ≥ d. More formally, let reach =n and reach ≤n be the predicates defined over the state space S as follows:
The predicate reach =n (s) holds iff s is reachable in exactly n transitions, while reach ≤n holds iff s can be reached in no more than n transitions. Then,
The above method of bounding the counterexample length is of limited value due to the difficulty of solving the quantified Boolean formula (2) . Another way of using BMC to prove properties (i.e., not merely for bug-finding) is k-induction [22] . With k-induction, to prove a property G p, one needs to a find an invariant q such that:
Other techniques for making BMC complete are cube enlargement [17] , circuit co-factoring [13] , and Craig interpolants [18] .
BMC for General LTL Properties: Original Encoding
In this Section we present the BMC encoding for full LTL, as originally proposed by Biere et al. [1] . A counterexample to F p can only be an infinite path. In order to use a finite path prefix to represent an infinite path, we consider potential backloops from the last state of a finite path prefix to an earlier state, as illustrated in Fig. 12 . More precisely, a valid path prefix (s 0 , ..., s , ..., s k ) has a back-loop from k to iff the transition relation R contains the pair (s k , s ). Note that an LTL formula is false iff its negation is true. So, the problem of finding a counterexample of an LTL formula f is equivalent to the problem of finding a witness to its negation ¬f . In this section, we will follow this approach.
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Given a state transition system M , an LTL formula f , and a bound k, we will construct a propositional formula M, f k that holds true iff there exists a path prefix (s 0 , ..., s k ) along which f holds true. We assume that all negations in f have been pushed inward so that they occur only directly in front of atomic propositions. First we define a propositional formula M k that constrains (s 0 , ..., s k ) to be a valid path prefix:
Now, we have to consider two cases, depending on whether the sequence (s 0 , ..., s k ) has a back-loop or not. First we consider the case without a back-loop. We introduce a bounded semantics, employing the following identities (similar to those used in the fixed-point characterizations of CTL discussed in Section 5.1):
Definition 9 (Bounded Semantics without a Back-Loop). Given a bound k and a finite or infinite sequence π whose first k states are (s 0 , ..., s k ), we say that an LTL formula f holds true along π with bound k iff π |= 0 k is true, where π |= i k is defined recursively as follows for i ∈ {0, ..., k}:
Note that the recursion is well-founded, since π |= i k X f is false if i ≥ k. This also means that formulas of the type G f do not hold true for any bound.
It is easily seen that π |= 0 k f implies π |= f for any infinite path π and LTL formula f . Given a bound k, an LTL formula f , and a valid path prefix (s 0 , ..., s k ), we construct a propositional formula f 0 k that is true iff π |= 0 k f . Definition 10 (Original translation of LTL formula without a loop).
where p is an atomic proposition
The translations for F and G are easily expanded:
we write a propositional formula that requires that g holds for some path suffix π j (where i ≤ j ≤ k) and that f holds on all path suffixes in the set {π n | i ≤ n < j}, as illustrated in Fig. 13 : 
.).
We construct a propositional formula f 0 k that holds iff f holds on π (in the usual LTL semantics).
Definition 12 (Loop Condition
Now we are ready to state the final translation into SAT, which we denote by " M, f k ":
Theorem 2. Given a LTL formula f , there exists a path π that satisfies f iff there exists a k such that M, f k is satisfiable. Equivalently, M |= A¬f iff M, f k is unsatisfiable for all k.
Improved Encoding for General LTL Properties
The translations that we have given above in Definitions 10 and 11 are not the most efficient, although they have the benefit of being relatively straightforward. More efficient translations are given in [15, 16, 2] ; these translations have the benefit of having size linear in k (the unrolling depth) for the U operator, compared to size cubic in k (or quadratic in k, if certain optimizations [6] are used) for the translations in Definitions 10 and 11. We use the same formula M k as the original encoding (defined in Equation 3 on page 22) to constrain the path to be a valid prefix. In addition, we define formulas for loop constraints, which are used to non-deterministically select at most one back-loop in the path prefix (s 0 , ..., s k ). We introduce k + 1 fresh loop selector variables, l 0 , ..., l k , which determine which possible back-loop (if any) to select. If l j is true (where 1 ≤ j ≤ k), then we select a back-loop from k to j. The state s j−1 is constrained to be equal to the state s k , and we consider an infinite path π = (s 0 , ..., s j−1 , s j , ..., s k , s j , ..., s k , ...). If none of the loop selector variables are true, we use the bounded semantics (Definition 9 on page 22).
We introduce auxiliary variables InLoop 0 through InLoop k , which will be constrained so that InLoop i is true iff position i is in the loop part of the path. In other words, InLoop i should be true iff there exist a position j ≤ i such that l j is true. To ensure that at most one of {l 0 , ..., l k } is true, we require that l i must not be true if there exists an earlier position j < i such that l j is true. Let |[LoopConstraints]| k be the conjunction of the following formulas for i ∈ {1, ..., k}:
In Fig. 15 For |[f U g]| i , we make two passes through the loop part of path prefix. On the first pass, we consider path suffixes π i through π k (see Fig. 16 ). If f holds true for all these path suffixes, but g never holds true, then we need to make a second pass and continue checking at the start of the back-loop (π j ). If we reach position k on the second pass without g ever being true, then we know that g is never true at any position in the loop, so f U g is false. The auxiliary definition f U g handles the second pass. The final encoding for Kripke structure M , LTL formula f , and bound k is given by |[M, f, k]|: More compact translations are possible using Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBF) [14] , although such translations generally cannot be solved faster (with existing QBF solvers) than SAT translations.
SAT Solvers
In this Section we discuss Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers, the key tool in bounded model checking. We begin with a few basic definitions. Definition 13. A formula is satisfiable iff there exists an assignment to the variables of the formula that makes the formula true.
Definition 14.
A formula is in negation-normal form (NNF) iff:
• all negations are directly in front of variables, and • the only logical connectives are conjunction ("∧"), disjunction ("∨"), and negation ("¬").
Definition 15.
A literal is a variable or its negation.
Definition 16.
A formula is in disjunctive normal form (DNF) iff it is a disjunction of conjunctions of literals.
For example, the below formula is in DNF:
Note that every formula in DNF is also in NNF. A simple (but inefficient) way to convert an arbitrary formula φ to DNF is to make a truth For example, the below formula is in CNF:
Modern SAT solvers require their input to be in CNF. An arbitrary formula can be converted to CNF in a manner similar to the above-described method for DNF. However, the resulting CNF formula can be exponentially larger than the original formula. A better way of converting to CNF is to use the Tseitin transformation [24] , which produces an equisatisfiable formula that is only linearly larger than the original formula. Two formulas are equisatisfiable when either they are both satisfiable or they are both unsatisfiable. The Tseitin transformation introduces new variables to represent subformulas of the original formula. The technique is perhaps best illustrated by considering a formula as a combinational circuit. A new variable is introduced to represent the output of each logic gate in the circuit. Let g top be the variable corresponding to the top-level gate (i.e., the gate whose output is the output of the circuit). We create the CNF formula by conjoining the unit clause (g top ) with clauses that relate each newly introduced gate variable to the inputs of the corresponding logic gate. For example, consider the circuit for (A ∨ (B ∧ C)) represented in Fig. 17 . To obtain the clauses that define g 1 , we start with the equivalence Note that since the Tseitin transformation introduces new variables, the resulting formula is not strictly equivalent to the original formula. Instead, it is equisatisfiable with the original formula.
We now briefly describe the main principles followed by SAT solvers. A CNF formula is represented by a set of clauses, and a clause is represented by a set of literals.
Definition 19.
A unit clause is a clause that contains exactly one literal.
Almost all modern SAT solvers use a variant of the DPLL algorithm [12] . This algorithm uses a backtracking search. The solver picks a variable in the input formula and decides a value for it. It then performs unit propagation: If the formula has a clause with exactly one literal, then the solver assigns that literal true and simplifies the formula under that assignment. Unit propagation is repeated until there are no more unit clauses. If a satisfying assignment is discovered, the solver returns true. If a falsifying assignment is discovered, the solver backtracks, undoing its decisions. High-level pseudocode of the DPLL algorithm is shown in Fig. 18 .
Great improvements to SAT solvers have been made beginning in the mid1990s. GRASP [12] introduced a powerful form of conflict analysis that enables (1) non-chronological backtracking, allowing the solver to avoid considering unfruitful assignments, and (2) learning of additional implied clauses, which enables to solver to discover more implied literals via unit propagation. When unit propagation forces a literal to be assigned a certain value, GRASP records the set of literals responsible. When a conflict is discovered, GRASP uses this information to derive a new clause. The learned clause is logically redundant, but it enables unit propagation to be more effective.
Another major breakthrough is the two watched literals scheme introduced by Chaff [19] . SAT solvers spend most of their time doing unit propagation, and the watched-literals scheme makes unit propagation significantly more efficient. 
Conclusion
The state explosion problem has been, and is likely to remain, the main challenge faced by model checking. Of the techniques developed to combat the state explosion problem, bounded model checking is one of the most successful. In practice, bounded model checking can often find counterexamples in circuits with thousands of latches and inputs. Armin Biere reported an example in which the circuit had 9510 latches and 9499 inputs. This resulted in a propositional formula with 4 million variables and 12 million clauses. The shortest bug of length 37 was found in only 69 seconds! Many others have reported similar results.
There are many directions for future research, including software model checking, hybrid-systems model checking, compositional model checking, statistical model checking, combining model checking with theorem proving, and scaling up even more!
